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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the impact of free cash flow on the agency costs and how these 
free cash flow and agency costs affect the performance of REITs in Asia. Unlike previous 
studies that focus on conventional non-regulated industry, the Asian REIT industry being a 
highly regulated industry provides a new context for further research. 
 
 The results indicate that free cash flow and agency costs persist over time in Asian 
REITs even though REITs are in a highly regulated industry. The findings also imply that REIT 
managers face substantial costs when they wish to adjust to the equilibrium level of agency 
costs, whereby the optimum level is always dynamic and not constant over time and moves 
with the changes in the determinants of agency costs. These agency costs persist over time 
and have significant impacts on the performance of REITs in Asia.  
 
Key words: free cash flow, agency costs, performance, dynamic, Asian REITs, GMM method. 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its introduction in 2002, Asian REITs have been booming and growing 
significantly, especially after post-Global Financial Crisis. Until today, REIT markets 
are now established in many countries in Asia Pacific region including Japan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong and there are 246 REITs in Asia Pacific region with a total 
market capitalization of over US$270 billion by December 2015 which accounts for 
18% of the global REIT market (Bloomberg). The new entry REIT country includes 
Pakistan. 
 
Although there are a lot of research on agency conflicts such as free cash flow 
and agency costs but these studies are on the conventional public companies. These 
researches broadly cover the aspects of free cash flow and the relevant free cash flow 
issues such as dividend policy, agency costs etc.; but only focus on non-regulated and 
conventional listed companies. 
 
For REITs, there are limited empirical researches on these aspects and most 
of these studies are US-centric. There are some empirical studies such as 
documented in Chen, Wang and Shyu (2012) examine how deviations from expected 
optimal cash holdings affect future stock returns in the US REIT industry, the combined 
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impact of corporate governance and excess cash holdings on the propensity of firms 
to become bidders (Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao, 2012), institutional investors and firm 
efficiency of REITs (Chung, Fung, and Hung, 2012). 
 
There is no research focusing on Asian REITs that examine the issues of free 
cash flow and agency costs. The primary objective of this research is to examine the 
impacts of free cash flow on agency costs. In addition, this paper also assesses the 
impacts of these free cash flows and agency costs on the performance, value and 
returns of REITs in Asia even though REITs are in a highly regulated industry. Unlike 
previous studies that focus on conventional non-regulated industry, the Asian REIT 
industry being a highly regulated industry provides a new context for further research. 
 
The panel data of the four biggest market capitalization of Asian REITs, namely, 
Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia is being used and the study period is from 
year 2002 to 2012. This study employs GMM method which is more robust compared 
to previous studies in conventional non-regulated industry that used pooled OLS 
method and panel data method. The Sargan test, AR(1) and AR(2) tests are being 
used to assess the models. 
 
 The findings drawn from this study can be used as a useful information and 
reference for all levels of the REIT industry in Asia. 
 
 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Free Cash Flow 
 
The free cash flow (FCF) theory was originally developed by Jensen (1986) in 
which free cash flow is defined as net cash flows after deducting the needs of positive 
net present value (NPV) projects. Many research studies on free cash flow are of non-
REITs such as in Gul and Tsui (1997), Brush, Philip and Margaretha (2000), Gul and 
Tsui (2001), Gregory (2005), Richardson (2006), Chang, Chen, Hsing and Huang 
(2007), Oprea (2008), Chen, Chou and Chou (2009), and Wang (2010).  
 
 For REITs, the results in Chen et al. (2012) show that cash holdings are 
inversely related to leverage and credit line access. This helps to alleviate the agency 
problem of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Their results indicate that the cash holding 
is positively associated with growth opportunities. The REIT managers access future 
growth opportunities and the external cost of capital, hold more cash for future 
investment opportunities, thus, this supports the pecking order theory. These findings 
are similar to those of previous studies (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Kim, 
Mauer and Sherman, 1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999; Hardin III, 
Highfield, Hill and Kelly, 2009). 
 
 In addition, Chen et al. (2012) also attribute that REIT firms that do not hold 
optimal cash holdings, the stock returns diminish. This is consistent with the findings 
of Li (2008) and Oler and Picconi (2010). Nevertheless, according to Chen et al. 
(2012), the detrimental effects of deviations above the estimated optimal cash levels 
are insignificantly stronger than those of deviations below the optimal level. 
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This also infers that the agency problems inherent in free cash flow (Jensen, 
1986), the abandonment of investment opportunities (Myers et al., 1984), and the 
likelihood of bankruptcy will decrease REIT firms’ stock returns. The divergence from 
the expected optimal cash holding further worsen the price performance, whether 
because of excess or insufficient cash. 
 
 Nevertheless, according to Chen et al. (2012), their results may suffer from 
sampling bias, specification bias, and estimation bias, thereby altering the estimated 
consequences. 
 
The findings of Ghosh et al. (2012) reveal that REITs with higher excess cash 
and lower insider ownership have the tendency to become bidders. Their results also 
document that there is a significantly positive valuation effect associated with the 
excess cash holdings for firms with lower insider ownership and cumulative abnormal 
return surrounding the merger announcement. They attribute it to be consistent with 
the hypothesis that investors are not averse by the REIT managers’ spending and 
expenditure on intra-industry acquisition. 
 
  
 
2.2 Agency Cost 
 
Many research studies on agency costs are on non-REITs such as studies done 
by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), Singh and Davidson III (2003), Fleming, Heaney and 
McCosker (2005), Florackis (2008), McKnight and Weir (2009), Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009), Jelinek and Stuerke (2009), Chi and Lee (2010), Henry (2010), Wang (2010), 
Hijazi and Conover (2011), He (2012) and Iskandar, Bukit and Sanusi (2012). 
  
For REITs, the findings of Chou, Hardin III, Hill and Kelly (2013) suggest that 
total, mandatory and discretionary dividends are valued by investors. Furthermore, the 
results also indicate that dividends are more highly valued for REITs with less 
transparent operating structure such as in UPREITs and REITs with more than fifty 
percent of its board comprised of insiders and affiliates. These findings are consistent 
with agency costs theory and imply that the discretionary dividends payout other than 
mandatory dividend payout is a substitute for weak corporate governance. The results 
are consistent with Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) and Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007), 
which show that REITs substitute dividends for weaker governance. 
 
Further, their results also suggest that cash flow generation (FFO) is an 
important determinant of value, and disbursement of this cash flow in the form of 
discretionary dividends can be value enhancing.  
 
The results also imply that the market recognizes these discretionary dividends 
paid are more highly valued for firms with less transparent operating and governance 
structures (Chou et al., 2013). According to Chou et al. (2013), the market’s 
recognition of this substitution should be relevant to REITs because of their 
dependence on external debt and equity markets. The willingness and ability to trade 
off forms of governance and policies reducing agency costs highlights the complexity 
of the interaction between firms and financial market participants. 
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 As a whole, there is limited research on REIT issues in Asia; whereas in US, 
there are more research studies and findings on US REITs. Perhaps in Asia, the 
development of Asian REITs is still in infancy stage as compare to the more mature 
market in US REITs. 
 
 Therefore, it is important to study the agency issues pertaining to the effects of 
free cash flow and agency costs on the performance of Asian REITs. This empirical 
study provides considerable insight into the impacts of free cash flows on the individual 
agency cost; and how free cash flow and the individual agency cost could have an 
influence on the performance, value and returns of Asian REITs. 
 
 
 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Research Method 
 
The GMM Method is being used in this research study because firstly, the 
regressors in the model are endogenous. These regressors may be correlated with 
the error term and this could lead to biased coefficients. Thus, GMM method is 
required. 
 
Secondly, in the random effects model, GLS estimator is biased in static model 
if these regressors are correlated with the error term. 
 
Thirdly, there is time invariant firms’ specific effect in the regression model. 
Although fixed effect model can be used, but the within estimator is biased and 
inconsistent as the number of individual increases and T is still relatively small. 
 
Fourthly, the panel data in the study have a long firm dimension where N>100 
and T<10. 
 
Fifthly, the GMM method allows for empirical modelling of dynamic while 
accounting for individual-specific dynamics. 
 
Moreover, following the studies in Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) and 
Flannery and Hankins (2013), the dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity exist in the above regression models in the study. Thus, the GMM is 
more robust to be employed in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Data Collection 
 
 The samples for this study comprise REITs from four major Asian REIT 
countries i.e. Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia. These countries are the 
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leaders in Asian REIT markets which account for 94% of the total market capitalization 
of REITs in Asia (Newell, 2012).  
 
 The study period is from the commencement of REITs in each country which 
covers the period from 2002 to 2012. The introduction of REITs differs among the 
Asian countries i.e. 2001 in Japan, 2002 in Singapore; 2004 in Malaysia, and 2005 in 
Hong Kong. Hence, the data collected will be an unbalanced panel data. The REIT 
IPOs in 2012 are not included in this study. 
 
These data and figures are collected from published annual company reports, 
company websites, REIT related publications, Thomson One Banker and Datastream. 
 
 
 
3.3 The Direct Agency Costs Regression Models 
 
3.3.1  Free Cash Flow 
 
The free cash flow is employed and being used as proxy for free cash flow and 
perceived likelihood of agency problems (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Wu, 2004; Chi and 
Lee, 2010). The first measure of free cash flow 1 (FCF1) is defined as follows: 
 
FCF1t = 
OCFt −Taxt −IExpt−CDivt −PDivt
BV Assetst
 
 
where 
OCFt denotes operating cash flows at time t; 
Taxt denotes corporate income tax expense at time t; 
IExpt denotes interest expense at time t; 
CDivt denotes common stock dividends at time t;  
PDivt denotes preferred stock dividends at time t; 
BV Assetst denotes book value of assets at time t. 
 
 
Following Chae, Kim and Lee (2009), the proxy for free cash flow 2 (FCF2) is 
defined as follows:  
 
FCF2t = 
EBITDAt
BV Assetst
 
 
where 
 
EBITDAt denotes earning before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization at 
time t; 
BV Assett denotes book value of assets at time t. 
 
In addition, following Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) and Hijazi et al. (2011), 
the third alternative proxy for free cash flow 3 (FCF3) is as follows: 
  
FCF3t = FCFFOAt – CEt 
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where 
 
FCFFOAt denotes free cash flow from operating activities at time t; 
CEt denotes capital expenditure at time t. 
 
 
 
3.3.2  Direct Agency Costs  
 
3.3.2.1  Asset Turnover 
 
Following Ang et al. (2000), Singh et al. (2003), McKnight et al. (2009), Fleming 
et al. (2005), Florackis (2008), Florackis et al.(2009), Jelinek et al. (2009), Wang 
(2010), Hijazi et al. (2011) and Iskandar et al.  (2012), there are few proxies for direct 
agency costs. The first proxy for direct agency costs is asset turnover which is the 
efficiency ratio of how REIT manager deploys its assets. The asset turnover is also 
defined as asset utilization ratio. The higher the sales-to-assets ratio indicates that the 
assets are generating significant sales and therefore, depicts that the lower is the 
agency costs.   
 
On the contrary, lower sales-to-assets ratio suggests that there is inefficiency 
in REIT management in implementing its policies such as poor investment decision, 
excessive perquisite consumption. Therefore, the sales-to-assets ratio is inversely 
related to the agency costs. The asset turnover is defined as follows: 
 
AssTt = 
Salest
Assetst
 
 
where 
 
AssTt denotes total asset turnover at time t;  
Salest denotes net sales at time t;  
Assetst denotes total assets at time t. 
 
 
 
3.3.2.2  Operating Expense Ratio 
 
The second direct agency costs proxy is the operating expense ratio. It is 
defined as operating expenses divided by net sales (Ang et al, 2000; Fleming et al., 
2005; Jelinek et al., 2009; Wang, 2010; Hijazi et al., 2011; and Iskandar, et al., 2012). 
The operating expense ratio is as follows: 
 
OpeRt = 
OpeEt
Salest
 
 
where  
OpeRt denotes operating expense ratio at time t;  
OpeEt denotes operating expenses at time t;  
Salest denotes net sales at time t. 
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3.3.2.3  Selling, General and Administrative Expenses Ratio 
 
The third direct agency costs proxy is selling, general and administrative 
expenses ratio (SGAR). It is defined as selling, general and administrative expenses 
scaled by net sales (Singh et al., 2003; Florackis, 2008; Florackis et al., 2009; Hijazi 
et al., 2011).  
  
The SGA expense is defined as the costs related to REIT management 
function, and costs to the sales. For instances, managerial salaries, rent, insurance, 
utilities, supplies, and advertising costs. Higher SGA expenses may induce higher 
agency costs, thus, this reflects the managerial discretionary expenses and excessive 
perquisite consumption. The SGAR is defined as follows: 
 
SGARt = 
SGAt
Salest
 
 
where 
 
SGARt denotes selling, general and administrative expenses ratio at time t;  
SGAt denotes selling, general and administrative expenses at time t;  
Salest denotes net sales at time t. 
 
 
 
3.3.2.4  Net Operating Income Volatility 
 
The fourth direct agency costs proxy is net operating income volatility. It is 
defined as the standard deviation of net operating income scaled by total sales over 
the sample period (Wang, 2010). The NOIVol1 is defined as follows: 
 
NOIVol1t = STD of ﴾
NOIt
 Salest
) 
 
where 
 
NOIVol1t denotes net operating income volatility 1 at time t;  
NOIt denotes net operating income at time t;  
STD denotes standard deviation;  
Salest denotes total sales at time t. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2.5  Net Income Volatility 
 
The fifth direct agency costs proxy is net income volatility (Wang, 2010). It is 
defined as the standard deviation of net income scaled by total sales over the sample 
period. The NIVol1 is defined as follows: 
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NIVol1t = STD of ﴾
NIt
Salest
)  
 
where 
 
NIVol1t denotes net income volatility 1 at time t;  
NIt denotes net income at time t;  
STD denotes standard deviation; 
Salest denotes total sales at time t. 
 
However, the firm’s individual and specific effects may also affect the free cash 
flow and direct agency costs proxies. Hence, this may cause heteroscedasticity in the 
model. Therefore, control variables are being used in order to control for firm’s 
individual and specific effect in the model. 
 
The direct agency costs regression models are as follows: 
 
AssTt = β0 + β1FCFt +β2Sizet + β3Aget + β4Growtht + β5Leveraget + β6DivPayt 
+ β7Profitabilityt + εt 
 
OpeRt = β0 + β1FCFt +β2Sizet + β3Aget + β4Growtht + β5Leveraget + β6DivPayt 
+ β7Profitabilityt + εt 
 
SGARt = β0+β1FCFt +β2Sizet + β3Aget + β4Growtht + β5Leveraget + β6DivPayt 
+ β7Profitabilityt + εt 
 
NOIVol1t = β0+β1FCFt +β2Sizet + β3Aget + β4Growtht + β5Leveraget + β6DivPayt 
+ β7Profitabilityt + εt 
 
NIVol1t = β0 + β1FCFt +β2Sizet + β3Aget + β4Growtht + β5Leveraget + β6DivPayt 
+ β7Profitabilityt + εt 
 
 
 
3.4  The REIT Performance Regression Model 
 
 The return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are being used to 
measure the performance of REITs in Asia.   
 
The general regression models of REIT agency costs on REIT performance are 
as follows: 
 
ROAt = β0 + β1FCFt + β2AssTt + β3OpeRt + β4SGARt + β5NOIVol1t + β6NIVol1t  
+ β7Sizet + β8Aget + β9Growtht + β10Leveraget+ β11DivPayt +β12Profitabilityt+ εt 
 
ROEt = β0 + β1FCFt + β2AssTt + β3OpeRt + β4SGARt + β5NOIVol1t + β6NIVol1t 
+ β7Sizet + β8Aget + β9Growtht + β10Leveraget+ β11DivPayt +β12Profitabilityt+ εt 
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3.5  The REIT Value Regression Model 
 
3.5.1  REIT Value 
 
The Tobin q is defined as follows: 
 
Tobin qt = 
MVAt + PSt  + Debtt
Book Value of Assett
 
 
where 
MVAt denotes market value of common equity at time t;  
PSt denotes market value of preferred equity at time t;  
Debtt denotes book value of total debt at time t;  
Book Value of Assett denotes book value of total assets at time t. 
 
The general regression model of REIT agency costs on REIT value is as 
follows: 
 
Tobin qt = β0 + β1FCFt + β2AssTt + β3OpeRt + β4SGARt + β5NOIVol1t + β6NIVol1t  
+ β7Sizet + β8Aget + β9Growtht + β10Leveraget+ β11DivPayt + β12Profitability+ β13Rmt  
+ εt 
 
 
 
 
3.6 The REIT Return Regression Model 
 
3.6.1  REIT Return 
 
The REIT return is defined as the REIT total stock return as follows: 
 
REIT Returnt = 
(Pt −Pt−1)+Dividendt 
Pt−1
 
 
 
 
where 
 
REIT Returnt denotes REIT total stock return at time t;  
Pt denotes REIT stock price at time t; 
Pt-1 denotes REIT stock price at time t-1; 
Dividendt denotes dividend at time t. 
 
The general regression model of REIT agency costs on REIT return is as 
follows: 
 
REIT Returnt = β0 + β1FCFt + β2AssTt + β3OpeRt + β4SGARt + β5NOIVol1t + β6NIVol1t  
+ β7Sizet + β8Aget + β9Growtht + β10Leveraget+ β11DivPayt + β12Profitability+ β13Rmt  
+ εt 
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3.7 Control Variables 
 
3.7.1  Size 
 
Prior studies such as Ooi and Liow (2004) and Lecomte and Ooi (2013) also 
incorporate firm size that may influence the performance and stock return in REITs.  
Moreover, Chen et al. (2012) and Hardin III et al. (2009) also contended that the cash 
holding is negatively associated with size of REITs. 
  
In addition, Ang et al. (2000), Singh et al. (2003), Iskandar et al. (2012), Henry 
(2010), Florackis et al. (2009), Jelinek et al. (2009) and Hijazi et al. (2011) also use 
firm size as a control variable in their studies. Thus, the natural log of total assets as 
the proxy for firm size is included in the regression model. The size is defined as 
follows: 
 
Sizet = ln (Total Assetst) 
 
 
 
3.7.2 Age 
 
Following the Coad, Segarra and Teruel (2013), Jelinek et al. (2009) and Hijazi 
et al. (2011) and Fleming et al. (2005) also use age as a control variable in their 
studies. Therefore, firm age is used as a control variable. The age is defined as follows: 
 
Aget = Age at time t. 
 
 
 
3.7.3 Growth 
 
From the literatures on REITs, it is found that Noguera (2012) uses market-to-
book ratio of equity and Lecomte et al. (2013) use market-to-book value in year t as a 
control variable. Others such as Chen et al. (2012), Hardin III et al. (2009), Hutchinson 
and Gul (2004) and Chen and Chen (2012) also use growth as a control variable 
although Baker (1993) and Gul (1999) posit a basic negative association between an 
exogenous variable, growth opportunities and firm performance. 
 
Thus, the proxy for growth is defined as follows: 
 
Growtht = Market-to-book value t 
  = 
(Book Value of Assetst− Book Value of Equityt+ Market Value of Equityt)
Book Value of Assetst
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.4 Leverage 
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The literature on REITs such as Chen et al. (2012), Hardin III et al. (2009), 
Noguera (2012) and Lecomte et al. (2013) also include leverage as a control variable 
in their regression models.  
 
Other literatures include Myers (1977), Grossman and Hart (1982),  
Easterbrook (1984), Smith and Watts (1992), Williams (1987), Ang et al. (2000), Singh 
et al. (2003), Florackis et al. (2009), Fleming et al. (2005), Jelinek et al. (2009), Henry 
(2010), Hijazi et al. (2011), Iskandar et al. (2012), and Al-Najjar (2013) also contended 
that financial leverage could influence firm performance. Therefore, leverage is 
included as a control variable. The leverage is defined as follows: 
 
Leveraget = Debtt / Assett 
 
 
 
3.7.5  Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
Following the literatures in Cleary (2006), Rozeff (1982), La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), Bartram, Brown, How and Verhoevan (2008), 
Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), Zwiebel (1996), Florackis et al. (2009), Feng et 
al. (2007), John and Knyazeka (2006), John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2011), Lee, 
Gupta, Chen and Lee (2011), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), Denis and 
Osobov (2008), Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) and Henry (2010), the dividend payout 
ratio is included as a control variable in this study. 
 
Moreover, the REIT regulations require REITs to distribute at least 90% of total 
income as dividend for tax exemption. Besides that, REITs are exempted from capital 
gains tax. Therefore, dividend payout is included as a control variable. The dividend 
payout ratio is defined as follows:  
 
Dividend Payout Ratiot = 
Total Dividendt
Net Incomet
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.6  Profitability 
 
Al-Najjar (2013), Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) and Jirapon, Kim and Kim 
(2011) depict that profitability which has effects on cash holding. Hence, profitability is 
also included in the regression model as a control variable. The profitability is defined 
as follows:  
 
Profitabilityt = 
Net Income After Interest and Taxes t 
Book Value of Equity t  
 
 
 
 
3.7.7  Market Return 
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 Market return refers to the return of major stock exchange indices of the 
respective countries i.e. Tokyo Price Index (TOPIX) for Japan; Straits Times Index 
(STI) for Singapore; Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) for 
Malaysia and Hang Seng Index (HSI) for Hong Kong. The market return is defined as 
follows: 
 
Rmt = 
Xt −Xt−1
Xt−1
 
 
where 
 
Rmt denotes market return at time t, a control variable; 
Xt denotes market index at time t; 
Xt-1 denotes market index at time t-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.0 RESULTS 
4.1  The Analysis of Free Cash Flow on Asset Turnover Ratio for the REITs in 
Asia 
 
 The results in Table 4.1 show that Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 4, Model 
5 and Model 6 passed all the Sargan test and AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively. 
13 
 
 
The free cash flow 1 (FCF1) is significantly positive at 1% level to asset turnover 
ratio in Model 1. This is also observed in free cash flow 3 (FCF3) whereby free cash 
flow 3 (FCF3) is also significantly positive at 1% level to asset turnover ratio in Model 
5. This is also observed in the robust standard error model in Model 6.  
 
This indicates that free cash flow supports the free cash flow theory. The free 
cash flow helps to induce agency costs in REITs. Therefore, it is in the same direction 
of asset turnover ratio.  
 
The results in Table 4.1 also show that free cash flow 2 (FCF2) is significantly 
negative at 1% level to asset turnover ratio in Model 3. This is also observed in the 
robust standard error model in Model 4. This indicates that free cash flow does not 
support the free cash flow theory. The free cash flow helps to mitigate agency cost, 
asset turnover in REITs. Therefore, it is in the opposite direction of asset turnover ratio.  
 
 In addition, the lagged asset turnover ratio is also significantly positive at 1% 
level to asset turnover ratio in Model 1, Model 3 and Model 5 respectively. This is also 
observed in the lagged asset turnover ratio in the robust standard error model in Model 
2. This indicates that lagged asset turnover ratio also helps to induce agency cost in 
REITs and it is dynamic in the model. 
 
Besides that, the size and growth are significantly negative to asset turnover 
respectively in all models except growth in Model 4. This indicates that size and growth 
help to mitigate and reduce agency costs in REITs. 
 
However, the age is significantly positive to asset turnover in all models. This 
helps to induce higher agency costs in REITs.  
 
Nonetheless, the profitability shows different signs in the results shown in Table 
4.1. The profitability is significantly positive at 1% level to asset turnover in Model 3 
and Model 4 respectively, but it is significantly negative at 1% level to asset turnover 
in Model 5.  
  
The leverage and dividend payout ratio are significantly negative at 5% and 
10% level to asset turnover in Model 3 and Model 1 respectively. 
 
 Interestingly, the constant is significantly positive at 1% level in all models 
respectively. Thus, this supports the fact that the individual REIT in Asia possesses its 
own unique characteristics. 
Table 4.1 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow (FCF) on Asset Turnover Ratio 
for the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
4.2 The Analysis of Free Cash Flow on Operating Expense Ratio for the REITs 
in Asia  
 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Asset Turnover Asset Turnover Asset Turnover Asset Turnover Asset Turnover Asset Turnover
Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio
Lagged 1 0.1424379 0.1424379 0.1100471 0.1100471 0.091683 0.091683
(4.56)*** (1.90)* (2.76)*** (1.40) (3.31)*** (1.10)
FCF1 0.0726934 0.0726934
(4.32)*** (1.51)
FCF2 -0.0396373 -0.0396373
(-5.26)*** (-2.65)***
FCF3 1.28E-08 1.28E-08
(13.87)*** (3.43)***
Size -0.049586 -0.049586 -0.0378243 -0.0378243 -0.0365156 -0.0365156
(-9.75)*** (-3.25)*** (-7.49)*** (-2.88)*** (-7.56)*** (-2.34)**
Age 0.0030816 0.0030816 0.0023402 0.0023402 0.0021633 0.0021633
(10.44)*** (3.54)*** (6.84)*** (2.73)*** (8.40)*** (2.55)**
Growth -0.0088538 -0.0088538 -0.0069441 -0.0069441 -0.0078653 -0.0078653
(-5.04)*** (-2.20)** (-4.10)*** (-1.49) (-6.37)*** (-2.40)**
Leverage -0.0001248 -0.0001248 -0.0134247 -0.0134247 0.0043644 0.0043644
(-0.02) (-0.01) (-2.39)** (-1.31) (0.82) (0.37)
Divpay ratio -0.0010485 -0.0010485 -0.0007171 -0.0007171 -0.0006437 -0.0006437
(-1.94)* (-0.97) (-1.20) (-0.60) (-1.07) (-0.47)
Profitability -0.0042425 -0.0042425 0.0175047 0.0175047 -0.0115793 -0.0115793
(-1.10) (-0.40) (15.61)*** (4.36)*** (-3.30)*** (-1.45)
Constant 0.3542277 0.3542277 0.2950035 0.2950035 0.2804732 0.2804732
(12.43)*** (4.05)*** (9.97)*** (3.68)*** (10.07)*** (3.09)***
Sargan Test 40.56485 37.61077 42.02215
[0.6197] [0.7406] [0.5567]
AR(1) -3.0158 -2.7153 -2.4518 -2.2382 -2.7064 -2.4016
[0.0026]** [0.0066]*** [0.0142]** [0.0252]** [0.0068]*** [0.0163]**
AR(2) 0.86861 0.84069 0.20755 0.19372 0.31125 0.29346
[0.3851] [0.4005] [0.8356] [0.8464] [0.7556] [0.7692]
No of 327 327 270 270 325 325
Observations
No of 53 53 53 53 53 53
Instruments
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The results in Table 4.2 show that Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 4, Model 
5 and Model 6 passed all the Sargan test and AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively.  
 
The free cash flow 1 (FCF1) is significantly negative at 1% level to operating 
expense ratio in Model 1. This indicates that free cash flow does not support the free 
cash flow theory. The free cash flow helps to mitigate agency cost, operating expense 
ratio in REITs. Therefore, it is in the opposite direction of operating expense ratio. 
 
However, the results in Table 4.2 also show that free cash flow 2 (FCF2) is 
significantly positive at 1% level to operating expense ratio in Model 3. This also 
indicates that free cash flow supports the free cash flow theory. The free cash flow 
helps to induce agency cost, operating expense ratio in REITs. Therefore, it is in the 
same direction of operating expense ratio. 
 
 Besides that, age, dividend payout ratio and profitability are significantly 
negative to operating expense ratio respectively in Model 1, Model 3 and Model 5 
respectively. This indicates that age, dividend payout ratio and profitability help to 
mitigate agency cost in REITs.  
 
The growth also shows significantly negative at 5% level to operating expense 
ratio in Model 5. The growth reduces operating expense ratio in REITs.  
 
The size is significantly positive to operating expense ratio in Model 1, Model 3 
and Model 5 respectively. This is also observed in the robust standard error model in 
Model 6. The bigger the REITs, the bigger the operating expense ratio in REITs in 
Asia. 
 
 Besides that, the leverage is significantly positive to operating expense ratio in 
all models respectively. This helps to induce higher agency costs in REITs. Hence, the 
leverage is one of the major operating expenses in REITs in Asia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow (FCF) on Operating Expense 
Ratio for the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
4.3  The Analysis of Free Cash Flow on Selling, General and Administrative 
Expenses Ratio (SGAR) for the REITs in Asia 
 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Operating Operating Operating Operating Operating Operating 
Expense Ratio Expense Ratio Expense Ratio Expense Ratio Expense Ratio Expense Ratio
Lagged 1 0.0286263 0.0286263 0.0272475 0.0272475 0.0095046 0.0095046
(1.28) (0.25) (1.22) (0.17) (0.33) (0.09)
FCF1 -0.6235739 -0.6235739
(-4.23)*** (-1.08)
FCF2 2.099927 2.099927
(4.57)*** (0.32)
FCF3 7.33E-09 7.33E-09
(1.04) (0.20)
Size 0.0695958 0.0695958 0.0813067 0.0813067 0.1861276 0.1861276
(2.85)*** (1.06) (4.28)*** (0.35) (10.43)*** (2.07)**
Age -0.0081495 -0.0081495 -0.0078221 -0.0078221 -0.0114562 -0.0114562
(-5.17)*** (-1.57) (-5.63)*** (-0.46) (-6.72)*** (-1.41)
Growth -0.0180924 -0.0180924 -0.0084313 -0.0084313 -0.0173057 -0.0173057
(-1.43) (-0.56) (-0.71) (-0.21) (-2.31)** (-0.57)
Leverage 0.3965281 0.3965281 0.6792638 0.6792638 0.378471 0.378471
(8.71)*** (2.97)*** (29.20)*** (2.26)** (9.00)*** (2.35)**
Divpay ratio -0.0077499 -0.0077499 -0.0090506 -0.0090506 -0.0097786 -0.0097786
(-4.89)*** (-1.29) (-3.31)*** (-0.67) (-4.41)*** (-1.47)
Profitability -0.0874897 -0.0874897 -1.421515 -1.421515 -0.1043057 -0.1043057
(-2.95)*** (-1.14) (-4.54)*** (-0.32) (-3.10)*** (-1.34)
Constant 0.0179049 0.0179049 -0.1531299 -0.1531299 -0.6660077 -0.6660077
(0.13) (0.05) (-1.31) (-0.11) (-5.88)*** (-1.25)
Sargan Test 32.96788 29.41054 35.18546
[0.8886] [0.9552] [0.8260]
AR(1) -1.9581 -1.6767 -1.7037 -1.2914 -2.0633 -1.8158
[0.0502]* [0.0936]* [0.0884]* [0.1966] [0.0391]** [0.0694]*
AR(2) -0.364 -0.31038 0.19247 0.06174 0.63295 0.52295
[0.7159] [0.7563] [0.8474] [0.9508] [0.5268] [0.6010]
No of 203 203 160 160 205 205
Observations
No of 53 53 53 53 53 53
Instruments
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The results in Table 4.3 show that Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 4, Model 
5 and Model 6 passed all the Sargan test and AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively.  
 
The results in Table 4.3 show that free cash flow 1 (FCF1) is significantly 
negative at 1% level to selling, general and administrative expenses ratio (SGAR) in 
Model 1. This indicates that free cash flow does not support the free cash flow theory. 
The free cash flow helps to mitigate and reduce agency cost, SGA ratio in REITs. 
Therefore, it is in the opposite direction of SGA ratio. 
 
However, the results in Table 4.3 also show that free cash flow 2 (FCF2) is 
significantly positive at 1% level to SGA ratio in Model 3. This also depicts that free 
cash flow supports the free cash flow theory. The free cash flow helps to induce 
agency costs in REITs. Therefore, it is in the same direction of SGA ratio. 
 
The lagged selling, general and administrative expenses ratio (lagged SGAR) 
is significantly positive to selling, general and administrative expenses ratio (SGAR) in 
all models respectively. 
 
The lagged selling, general and administrative expenses ratio (lagged SGAR) 
induces higher agency cost in REITs. It is in the same direction of selling, general and 
administrative expenses ratio (SGAR) and it is dynamic in the model.  
 
However, growth is significantly negative to SGA ratio in Model 1, Model 3 and 
Model 5 respectively. The growth is in the opposite direction of selling, general and 
administrative expenses ratio (SGAR). Thus, this indicates that growth helps to 
mitigate agency costs in REITs.  
 
In addition, age and profitability are also significantly negative to SGA ratio in 
Model 1 and Model 3 respectively. The age and profitability help to mitigate and reduce 
agency cost in REITs.  
 
Nonetheless, dividend payout ratio is significantly positive to SGA ratio in all 
models respectively except Model 2. This is also observed in size and leverage which 
are significantly positive to SGA ratio in Model 1 and Model 3 respectively.  
 
Interestingly, dividend payout ratio induces agency cost that is significantly 
shown in SGA ratio in the results in Table 4.3. This contradicts to the results in Table 
4.1 and Table 4.2 whereby dividend payout ratio helps to reduce agency cost in REITs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow (FCF) on Selling, General and 
Administrative Expenses Ratio (SGAR) for the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
4.4  The Analysis of Free Cash Flow on Net Operating Income Volatility 1 
(NOIVOL1) for the REITs in Asia 
 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
SGA Ratio SGA Ratio SGA Ratio SGA Ratio SGA Ratio SGA Ratio
Lagged 1 0.3098802 0.3098802 0.314982 0.314982 0.2864883 0.2864883
(10.46)*** (2.52)** (7.77)*** (2.67)*** (6.67)*** (2.23)**
FCF1 -0.3809629 -0.3809629
(-2.98)*** (-1.38)
FCF2 0.5458043 0.5458043
(2.98)*** (1.07)
FCF3 -3.57E-09 -3.57E-09
(-0.16) (-0.05)
Size 0.2474204 0.2474204 -0.0696776 -0.0696776 -0.0087473 -0.0087473
(3.16)*** (0.91) (-0.94) (-0.39) (-0.09) (-0.05)
Age -0.0136026 -0.0136026 0.0043043 0.0043043 0.0023351 0.0023351
(-3.18)*** (-1.08) (1.17) (0.43) (0.46) (0.24)
Growth -0.0493006 -0.0493006 -0.1173097 -0.1173097 -0.0777874 -0.0777874
(-1.67)* (-0.85) (-4.97)*** (-1.46) (-2.48)** (-1.56)
Leverage -0.0334971 -0.0334971 0.2260554 0.2260554 -0.0061598 -0.0061598
(-0.54) (-0.23) (3.99)*** (1.50) (-0.10) (-0.04)
Divpay ratio 0.0117048 0.0117048 0.0313114 0.0313114 0.0254284 0.0254284
(1.79)* (0.90) (5.43)*** (2.06)** (3.17)*** (2.36)**
Profitability -0.0028301 -0.0028301 -0.3640482 -0.3640482 -0.027122 -0.027122
(-0.09) (-0.04) (-2.80)*** (-1.13) (-0.75) (-0.52)
Constant -1.278772 -1.278772 0.5019925 0.5019925 0.1809667 0.1809667
(-2.82)*** (-0.82) (1.14) (0.46) (0.31) (0.18)
Sargan Test 18.49592 14.59914 13.78204
[0.7301] [0.9084] [0.8414]
AR(1) -1.9434 -1.5543 -1.7478 -1.3749 -1.7718 -1.3242
[0.0520]* [0.1201] [0.0805]* [0.1692] [0.0764]* [0.1854]
AR(2) 0.56883 0.49991 0.37985 0.33427 0.16646 0.14716
[0.5695] [0.6171] [0.7041] [0.7382] [0.8678] [0.8830]
No of 141 141 101 101 139 139
Observations
No of 32 32 32 32 29 29
Instruments
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The results in Table 4.4 show that only Model 3, Model 4, Model 5 and Model 
6 passed all the Sargan test and AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively. The Model 1 and 
Model 2 failed to pass the AR(2) test respectively.  
 
The free cash flow 2 (FCF2) is significantly positive at 1% level to net operating 
income volatility 1 (NOIVOL1) in Model 3. This indicates that free cash flow supports 
the free cash flow theory. The free cash flow helps to induce agency costs in REITs. 
Therefore, it is in the same direction of NOIVOL1. 
 
However, the results in Table 4.4 also show that free cash flow 3 (FCF3) is 
significantly negative at 1% level to NOIVOL1 in Model 5. This is also observed in the 
robust standard error model in Model 6. This also provides empirical evidence that 
free cash flow does not support the free cash flow theory. The free cash flow helps to 
mitigate and reduce agency costs in REITs. Therefore, it is in the opposite direction of 
NOIVOL1.  
  
However, the lagged net operating income volatility 1 (lagged NOIVOL1) is 
significantly positive at 1% level to net operating income volatility 1 (NOIVOL1) in 
Model 5.  
 
 The lagged net operating income volatility 1 (lagged NOIVOL1) induces higher 
agency cost in REITs. It is in the same direction of NOIVOL1 and it is dynamic in the 
model. 
 
Besides that, size is significantly negative to net operating income volatility 1 
(NOIVOL1) in Model 3, Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 respectively. This indicates that 
size helps to mitigate agency costs in REITs.  
 
The growth is significantly negative to net operating income volatility 1 
(NOIVOL1) in Model 3 and Model 4 respectively. However, growth is also significantly 
positive to net operating income volatility 1 (NOIVOL1) in Model 5. This indicates that 
growth can help to mitigate agency cost or induce agency cost in net operating income 
volatility 1 (NOIVOL1). 
 
The age is significantly positive to NOIVOL1 in Model 3 and Model 4 
respectively. The leverage and dividend payout ratio are significantly positive to 
NOIVOL1 in Model 3 and Model 5 respectively.  
 
Besides that, the profitability is significantly positive to NOIVOL1 in Model 3 and 
Model 5 respectively. This helps to induce higher agency costs in REITs.  
 
 Interestingly, the constant is significantly positive at 1% level in all the Model 3, 
Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 respectively. Thus, this supports the fact that the 
individual REIT in Asia possesses its own unique characteristics. 
 
 
Table 4.4 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow (FCF) on Net Operating Income 
Volatility 1 (NOIVOL1) for the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
4.5  The Analysis of Free Cash Flow on Net Income Volatility 1 (NIVOL1) for 
the REITs in Asia  
 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
NOIVOL1 NOIVOL1 NOIVOL1 NOIVOL1 NOIVOL1 NOIVOL1
Lagged 1 0.013552 0.013552 -0.0068488 -0.0068488 0.0442396 0.0442396
(5.74)*** (0.65) (-1.08) (-0.10) (10.93)*** (1.52)
FCF1 0.4176339 0.4176339
(3.61)*** (1.07)
FCF2 0.35018 0.35018
(5.54)*** (1.16)
FCF3 -8.50E-08 -8.50E-08
(-12.45)*** (-2.68)***
Size -1.71971 -1.71971 -1.928193 -1.928193 -0.5223864 -0.5223864
(-28.32)*** (-2.86)*** (-38.53)*** (-3.22)*** (-25.75)*** (-5.10)***
Age 0.0822385 0.0822385 0.0931623 0.0931623 0.0006777 0.0006777
(19.84)*** (2.13)** (19.75)*** (2.68)*** (0.51) (0.12)
Growth -0.1217005 -0.1217005 -0.1316425 -0.1316425 0.0095885 0.0095885
(-8.52)*** (-1.38) (-14.79)*** (-1.91)* (1.92)* (0.48)
Leverage 0.1977403 0.1977403 0.1949575 0.1949575 0.0153594 0.0153594
(3.79)*** (1.29) (5.91)*** (1.40) (0.62) (0.21)
Divpay ratio 0.0160456 0.0160456 0.002045 0.002045 0.0083282 0.0083282
(2.67)*** (0.99) (0.40) (0.14) (3.72)*** (1.26)
Profitability 0.1791466 0.1791466 0.0802021 0.0802021 0.0388206 0.0388206
(6.50)*** (1.93)* (6.38)*** (1.63) (2.67)*** (0.72)
Constant 10.31888 10.31888 11.65934 11.65934 3.332545 3.332545
(26.74)*** (2.85)*** (34.12)*** (3.24)*** (29.83)*** (5.59)***
Sargan Test 42.64221 25.63547 40.29749
[0.5299] [0.9878] [0.6311]
AR(1) -2.5182 -2.4574 -2.2914 -2.2335 -1.3166 -1.3089
[0.0118]** [0.0140]** [0.0219]** [0.0255]** [0.1880] [0.1906]
AR(2) 1.8102 1.6898 0.83717 0.79974 0.79754 0.67753
[0.0703]* [0.0911]* [0.4025] [0.4239] [0.4251] [0.4981]
No of 327 327 267 267 323 323
Observations
No of 53 53 53 53 53 53
Instruments
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The results in Table 4.5 show that only Model 1 and Model 2 passed all the 
Sargan test and AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively. The Model 3, Model 4, Model 5 
and Model 6 failed to pass the AR(2) test respectively.  
 
The free cash flow 1 (FCF1) is significantly negative at 1% level to net income 
volatility 1 (NIVOL1) in Model 1. This indicates that free cash flow does not support 
the free cash flow theory. The free cash flow helps to mitigate agency costs in REITs. 
Therefore, it is in the opposite direction of NIVOL1.  
 
However, the lagged net income volatility 1 (lagged NIVOL1) is significantly 
positive at 1% level to net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) in Model 1. The lagged net 
income volatility 1 (lagged NIVOL1) helps to induce higher agency cost in REITs. It is 
in the same direction of NIVOL1 and it is dynamic in the model.  
 
Besides that, size, growth and profitability are significantly negative to net 
income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) respectively in Model 1. This indicates that bigger REITs 
can help to mitigate and reduce agency cost, net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) in REITs.  
 
The age, leverage and dividend payout ratio are significantly positive to net 
income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) in Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. The age, leverage 
and dividend payout ratio help to induce higher agency cost, net income volatility 1 
(NIVOL1) in REITs in Asia.  
 
 Interestingly, the constant is significantly positive at 1% level in Model 1 and 
Model 2 respectively. Thus, this supports the fact that the individual REIT in Asia 
possesses its own unique characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow (FCF) on Net Income Volatility 1 
(NIVOL1) for the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
4.6 The Analysis of Free Cash Flow and Agency Costs on Return on Assets 
(ROA) for the REITs in Asia 
 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
NIVOL1 NIVOL1 NIVOL1 NIVOL1 NIVOL1 NIVOL1
Lagged 1 0.1382761 0.1382761 0.2823109 0.2823109 0.0882741 0.0882741
(31.05)*** (1.57) (97.40)*** (5.39)*** (24.17)*** (1.29)
FCF1 -1.86969 -1.86969
(-5.32)*** (-1.23)
FCF2 0.8079871 0.8079871
(19.90)*** (1.99)**
FCF3 -2.30E-07 -2.30E-07
(-30.26)*** (-2.63)***
Size -2.078866 -2.078866 -1.541096 -1.541096 -1.273249 -1.273249
(-56.78)*** (-5.79)*** (-34.27)*** (-5.64)*** (-27.91)*** (-3.16)***
Age 0.0403683 0.0403683 0.0584222 0.0584222 0.0020803 0.0020803
(11.39)*** (1.76)* (17.99)*** (3.40)*** (0.75) (0.08)
Growth -0.1097602 -0.1097602 -0.2632299 -0.2632299 -0.1035873 -0.1035873
(-9.18)*** (-1.02) (-42.81)*** (-2.26)** (-14.42)*** (-1.04)
Leverage 0.9321038 0.9321038 0.1195812 0.1195812 0.6047024 0.6047024
(11.18)*** (1.86)* (5.98)*** (0.43) (10.91)*** (1.63)
Divpay ratio 0.0519854 0.0519854 0.0155246 0.0155246 0.0366149 0.0366149
(7.30)*** (1.81)* (5.39)*** (0.51) (18.88)*** (1.24)
Profitability -0.0666648 -0.0666648 -0.5891334 -0.5891334 -0.2146349 -0.2146349
(-3.38)*** (-0.20) (-85.70)*** (-5.18)*** (-13.75)*** (-0.82)
Constant 12.59365 12.59365 9.742419 9.742419 8.092476 8.092476
(66.43)*** (6.29)*** (34.65)*** (5.96)*** (32.45)*** (3.56)***
Sargan Test 43.55657 43.49605 50.1648
[0.4905] [0.4931] [0.2422]
AR(1) -1.413 -1.2988 -1.6447 -1.6306 -1.0846 -1.0576
[0.1576] [0.1940] [0.1000] [0.1030] [0.2781] [0.2902]
AR(2) -0.11449 -0.11352 1.6782 1.6559 1.8901 1.8318
[0.9089] [0.9096] [0.0933]* [0.0977]* [0.0587]* [0.0670]*
No of 327 327 269 269 323 323
Observations
No of 53 53 53 53 53 53
Instruments
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The results in Table 4.6 show that Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 4, Model 
5 and Model 6 passed all the Sargan test and AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively.  
 
 The results in Table 4.6 show that free cash flow 2 (FCF2) is significantly 
positive to ROA at in Model 3. This is also observed in the robust standard error model 
in Model 4. This indicates that free cash flow has positive impact on return on assets 
(ROA) in REITs in Asia. This highlights the complexity of the capital market whereby 
the REITs’ unitholders also perceive cash flow as an important element that would 
assert positive impacts on the return of assets (ROA) in the capital market.  
 
The asset turnover ratio is significantly negative to ROA in Model 3 and 
operating expense ratio is also significantly negative to ROA in Model 1 respectively. 
These are the agency costs in REITs. Hence, these signs are in the opposite direction 
of ROA.  
 
Interestingly, the net operating income volatility 1 (NOIVOL1) is significantly 
positive to ROA in Model 5. 
 
 Nonetheless, the net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) shows dual directions in the 
results in Table 4.6. In Model 1, the net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) is significantly 
positive at 10% level to ROA but the net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) is significantly 
negative at 1% level to ROA in Model 5. 
 
The profitability is significantly positive at 1% level to ROA in Model 1, Model 2, 
Model 5 and Model 6 respectively. The profitability enhances the return on assets 
(ROA). Thus, it is in the same direction of ROA.  
 
However, growth and dividend payout ratio are significantly negative to ROA in 
Model 1, Model 2 and Model 5 respectively. The growth is consistent with Baker (1993) 
and Gul (1999). The dividend payout ratio is the agency costs in REITs. Hence, the 
dividend payout ratio is in the opposite direction of ROA.  
 
Besides that, the age is significantly negative to ROA in Model 1. This indicates 
that older REITs decrease in performance, return on assets (ROA). Therefore, it is in 
the opposite direction of ROA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow and Agency Costs on Return on 
Assets (ROA) for the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
4.7 The Analysis of Free Cash Flow and Agency Costs on Return on Equity 
(ROE) for the REITs in Asia 
 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
Lagged 1 -0.0204552 -0.0204552 0.0046951 0.0046951 -0.0161308 -0.0161308
(-1.29) (-1.22) (0.33) (0.13) (-1.51) (-0.49)
FCF1 -1.957561 -1.957561
(-0.11) (-0.09)
FCF2 100.7076 100.7076
(4.29)*** (2.14)**
FCF3 1.53E-06 1.53E-06
(0.87) (0.52)
Asset Turnover -18.12584 -18.12584 -88.90574 -88.90574 -19.14057 -19.14057
Ratio (-0.43) (-0.26) (-2.69)*** (-1.38) (-0.53) (-0.29)
Operating -9.107299 -9.107299 -1.308206 -1.308206 -7.419763 -7.419763
Expense Ratio (-2.47)** (-1.42) (-0.25) (-0.23) (-1.64) (-0.80)
SGA Ratio 3.019426 3.019426 -1.147093 -1.147093 2.96677 2.96677
(0.45) (0.35) (-0.31) (-0.29) (0.22) (0.12)
NOIVOL1 -8.331788 -8.331788 -12.29551 -12.29551 8.335173 8.335173
(-1.28) (-0.88) (-0.52) (-0.25) (2.25)** (0.87)
NIVOL1 2.028084 2.028084 0.1699292 0.1699292 -1.544164 -1.544164
(1.88)* (1.09) (0.08) (0.04) (-3.20)*** (-1.07)
Size 7.297152 7.297152 -6.270608 -6.270608 2.950929 2.950929
(1.44) (0.87) (-1.02) (-0.51) (0.43) (0.30)
Age -0.4685077 -0.4685077 -0.034653 -0.034653 -0.2949372 -0.2949372
(-2.05)** (-1.33) (-0.14) (-0.07) (-0.76) (-0.57)
Growth -3.120714 -3.120714 -2.096912 -2.096912 -3.768229 -3.768229
(-2.15)** (-1.77)* (-0.91) (-0.52) (-2.17)** (-1.20)
Leverage -6.476518 -6.476518 0.9761193 0.9761193 12.3588 12.3588
(-0.65) (-0.41) (0.23) (0.12) (0.87) (0.45)
Divpay ratio -0.7209237 -0.7209237 0.2068655 0.2068655 -0.6070145 -0.6070145
(-3.93)*** (-2.54)** (0.66) (0.36) (-2.15)** (-1.09)
Profitability 68.85905 68.85905 0.931617 0.931617 73.14286 73.14286
(26.48)*** (17.38)*** (0.06) (0.03) (19.44)*** (9.51)***
Constant -29.53807 -29.53807 49.10791 49.10791 -10.35494 -10.35494
(-0.90) (-0.53) (1.15) (0.58) (-0.24) (-0.16)
Sargan Test 4.227363 3.674241 11.15649
[1.0000] [1.0000] [0.9988]
AR(1) -1.5006 -1.4751 -2.0486 -2.0011 -1.8529 -1.7864
[0.1335] [0.1402] [0.0405]** [0.0454]** [0.0639]* [0.0740]*
AR(2) -0.48589 -0.42909 1.2525 1.0398 0.81249 0.77215
[0.6270] [0.6679] [0.2104] [0.2984] [0.4165] [0.4400]
No of 79 79 60 60 84 84
Observations
No of 45 45 41 41 43 43
Instruments
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The results in Table 4.7 show that Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 5 and 
Model 6 passed all the Sargan test and AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively. 
 
The results in Table 4.7 show that free cash flow is not significant to return on 
equity (ROE) at all in all models respectively.  
 
Nevertheless, the lagged return on equity (lagged ROE) is significantly negative 
to return on equity (ROE) in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 5 respectively. The lagged 
return on equity (lagged ROE) asserts a significantly negative relationship on return 
on equity (ROE) and it is dynamic in the model.  
 
In addition, asset turnover ratio, operating expense ratio and net operating 
income volatility 1 (NOIVOL1) are significantly negative to return on equity (ROE) in 
Model 3 and Model 1 respectively. These are the agency costs in REITs. Hence, there 
are in opposite direction of return on equity (ROE). 
 
 Nonetheless, the net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) postulates 10% significance 
to the return on equity (ROE) in REITs. 
The profitability is significantly positive at 1% level to return on equity (ROE) in 
all models respectively. The profitability enhances the return on equity (ROE). Thus, it 
is in the same direction of ROE. This is identical to the results of profitability in Table 
4.6 
 
However, the growth is significantly negative to return on equity (ROE) in Model 
1, Model 5 and Model 6 respectively. This indicates that growth has negative effect on 
return on equity (ROE). Therefore, it is in the opposite direction of return on equity 
(ROE). This is consistent with Baker (1993) and Gul (1999).   
 
In addition, size and leverage are also significantly negative to return on equity 
(ROE) respectively. The bigger the REITs, the return on equity is lesser. The leverage 
is the agency cost in REITs. Thus, it is in the opposite direction of return on equity 
(ROE).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow and Agency Costs on Return on 
Equity (ROE) for the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
4.8 The Analysis of Free Cash Flow and Agency Costs on Tobin Q for the 
REITs in Asia 
 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5 Model 6
ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE
Lagged 1 -0.0551067 -0.0551067 -0.0254284 -0.0530131 -0.0530131
(-2.95)*** (-1.77)* (-1.31) (-2.65)*** (-1.22)
FCF1 -8.909087 -8.909087
(-1.01) (-0.69)
FCF2 8.30386
(0.36)
FCF3 1.46E-07 1.46E-07
(0.18) (0.10)
Asset Turnover -50.36653 -50.36653 -270.7563 -41.41845 -41.41845
Ratio (-1.46) (-0.92) (-2.52)** (-0.94) (-0.63)
Operating 4.311229 4.311229 -24.36095 -0.5690485 -0.5690485
Expense Ratio (1.53) (0.67) (-1.99)** (-0.17) (-0.07)
SGA Ratio 0.4773626 0.4773626 2.530291 1.959889 1.959889
(0.21) (0.18) (0.91) (1.29) (0.53)
NOIVOL1 -16.88015 -16.88015 -143.063 4.672065 4.672065
(-2.85)*** (-1.55) (-2.19)** (0.49) (0.22)
NIVOL1 1.877409 1.877409 8.660591 -1.752239 -1.752239
(1.80)* (1.18) (1.67)* (-1.30) (-0.68)
Size -2.244587 -2.244587 -31.73766 1.951426 1.951426
(-0.51) (-0.33) (-1.96)** (0.47) (0.42)
Age 0.0634363 0.0634363 -0.5754502 -0.0995373 -0.0995373
(0.37) (0.23) (-1.32) (-0.45) (-0.67)
Growth -3.490572 -3.490572 -0.4458783 -4.623749 -4.623749
(-2.04)** (-1.44) (-0.16) (-4.78)*** (-6.24)***
Leverage -15.26692 -15.26692 15.12774 3.187229 3.187229
(-3.36)*** (-1.73)* (1.29) (0.30) (0.13)
Divpay ratio 0.0366936 0.0366936 0.1460653 -0.2650906 -0.2650906
(0.27) (0.13) (0.99) (-0.54) (-0.34)
Profitability 103.2204 103.2204 100.6358 105.1719 105.1719
(82.95)*** (41.67)*** (7.72)*** (65.46)*** (30.30)***
Constant 24.76311 24.76311 243.3632 -2.90929 -2.90929
(0.89) (0.58) (2.14)** (-0.10) (-0.08)
Sargan Test 3.693257 2.252914 9.197519
[1.0000] [1.0000] [0.9998]
AR(1) -1.9187 -1.8111 1.3218 -1.686 -1.5613
[0.0550]* [0.0701]* [0.1862] [0.0918]* [0.1184]
AR(2) -0.14142 -0.11896 1.6081 1.0728 0.58817
[0.8875] [0.9053] [0.1078] [0.2834] [0.5564]
No of 80 80 61 85 85
Observations
No of 45 45 41 43 43
Instruments
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The results in Table 4.8 shows that only Model 1, Model 2, Model 5 and Model 
6 passed all the Sargan test and AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively. The Model 3 and 
Model 4 failed to pass the AR(2) test respectively.  
 
The results in Table 4.8 show that free cash flow is not significant to Tobin q at 
all in all the four models respectively.  
 
The lagged Tobin Q is significantly positive to Tobin Q. The lagged Tobin 
asserts a significantly positive relationship on Tobin Q and it is dynamic in the model.  
 
 Besides that, asset turnover ratio and net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) are 
significantly negative to Tobin q in Model 1 respectively. These are the agency costs 
in REITs that would devalue the REITs. Thus, there are in the opposite direction of 
Tobin q. 
However, interestingly, the net operating income volatility 1 (NOIVOL1) is 
significantly positive at 10% level to Tobin q in Model 1. This highlights the complexity 
of the capital market whereby the REIT unitholders also emphasize that net operating 
income is necessary to uphold the value of the REITs in Asia. The divergence from 
the expected net operating income would be detrimental to value of the REITs in Asia. 
This is consistent with Chen et al. (2012).  
 
The growth is significantly positive at 1% level to Tobin q in all the four models 
respectively. The results are consistent with the strand of literatures whereby growth 
is positively related to the value of firm, Tobin q. The growth enhances the value of 
REITs in Asia. Thus, it is in the same direction of Tobin q.  
 
In addition, the age is significantly positive to Tobin q in Model 1 and Model 5 
respectively. This indicates that the older REITs in Asia have more competitive edge 
in enhancing the value of the REITs. 
 
Nonetheless, size and profitability are significantly negative to Tobin q in Model 
5 and Model 1 respectively.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow and Agency Costs on Tobin Q for 
the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
4.9 The Analysis of Free Cash Flow and Agency Costs on REIT Return for the 
REITs in Asia 
 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
TOBIN Q TOBIN Q TOBIN Q TOBIN Q TOBIN Q TOBIN Q
Lagged 1 0.0761267 0.0761267 0.0302033 0.0302033 0.0074446 0.0074446
(2.38)** (1.00) (1.05) (0.66) (0.25) (0.10)
FCF1 -0.0394682 -0.0394682
(-0.13) (-0.08)
FCF2 2.066546 2.066546
(1.01) (0.81)
FCF3 -2.63E-08 -2.63E-08
(-1.60) (-0.68)
Asset Turnover -1.247103 -1.247103 -0.4629657 -0.4629657 -0.4553138 -0.4553138
Ratio (-2.71)*** (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.55) (-1.30) (-0.36)
Operating -0.0695495 -0.0695495 -0.1656911 -0.1656911 -0.0764902 -0.0764902
Expense Ratio (-0.93) (-0.46) (-1.92)* (-2.34)** (-0.81) (-0.27)
SGA Ratio -0.0652911 -0.0652911 0.0033234 0.0033234 -0.0574791 -0.0574791
(-1.63) (-0.44) (0.09) (0.11) (-0.78) (-0.47)
NOIVOL1 0.7040326 0.7040326 0.3671755 0.3671755 0.0150716 0.0150716
(1.80)* (0.89) (0.55) (0.33) (0.35) (0.04)
NIVOL1 -0.1513689 -0.1513689 -0.0799202 -0.0799202 -0.0133152 -0.0133152
(-2.06)** (-0.96) (-0.89) (-0.55) (-1.46) (-0.30)
Size -0.1426774 -0.1426774 -0.1102791 -0.1102791 -0.2010777 -0.2010777
(-1.44) (-0.58) (-1.02) (-0.66) (-1.98)** (-0.94)
Age 0.0122959 0.0122959 0.0074649 0.0074649 0.0138992 0.0138992
(2.75)*** (1.02) (1.91)* (1.07) (2.06)** (1.17)
Growth 1.018151 1.018151 0.9983419 0.9983419 1.011719 1.011719
(101.83)*** (15.07)*** (27.05)*** (29.17)*** (48.06)*** (18.37)***
Leverage -0.2651107 -0.2651107 0.1759441 0.1759441 -0.0348452 -0.0348452
(-1.28) (-0.40) (0.43) (0.46) (-0.50) (-0.12)
Divpay ratio 0.003155 0.003155 0.0141201 0.0141201 -0.0003517 -0.0003517
(1.59) (0.41) (1.08) (0.87) (-0.12) (-0.06)
Profitability -0.1993538 -0.1993538 -1.443588 -1.443588 -0.0037814 -0.0037814
(-1.72)* (-0.62) (-1.05) (-0.86) (-0.20) (-0.09)
Market 0.0068626 0.0068626 -0.003028 -0.003028 -0.0033728 -0.0033728
Return (1.22) (0.44) (-0.30) (-0.19) (-0.42) (-0.13)
Constant 0.8990292 0.8990292 0.6125118 0.6125118 1.170796 1.170796
(1.60) (0.59) (0.80) (0.52) (2.14)** (0.93)
Sargan Test 8.210824 2.05764 12.99841
[1.0000] [1.0000] [0.9970]
AR(1) -0.15891 -0.10251 -0.90434 -0.8547 -1.1136 -0.5948
[0.8737] [0.9183] [0.3658] [0.3927] [0.2655] [0.5520]
AR(2) -1.1938 -0.92895 -1.8103 -1.8048 -1.3948 -1.1456
[0.2325] [0.3529] [0.0703]* [0.0711]* [0.1631] [0.2519]
No of 88 88 66 66 94 94
Observations
No of 47 47 43 43 45 45
Instruments
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The results in Table 4.9 show that all models passed all the Sargan test and 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests respectively.  
 
The results in Table 4.9 show that free cash flow is not significant to REIT return 
at all in all models respectively.  
 
However, the lagged REIT return is significantly negative to REIT return in 
Model 1, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5 respectively and it is dynamic in the Model 1, 
Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5 respectively.  
 
 The net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) is significantly negative to REIT return in 
Model 3. The net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) is the agency cost in REITs that would 
be detrimental to REIT return. Thus, it is in the opposite direction of REIT return. 
 
The growth is significantly positive to REIT return in all models respectively 
except Model 6. The growth enhances the return of REITs in Asia. Thus, it is in the 
same direction of REIT return.  
 
In addition, the age is significantly positive to REIT return in all models 
respectively except Model 4 and Model 6. This indicates that the older REITs in Asia 
have more competitive edge in increasing the REIT return.  
 
 Besides that, market return is significantly positive to REIT return in all models 
respectively. Market return accelerates the REIT return in Asia. Hence, it is in the same 
direction of REIT return. This is consistent with the strand of literatures that market 
return is always positively related to the return. 
 Nonetheless, size is significantly negative to REIT return in Model 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 The Results of Two-Step Different GMM and Two-Step Different GMM 
with Robust Standard Error of Free Cash Flow and Agency Costs on REIT Return 
for the REITs in Asia. 
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Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in squared brackets. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
5.0  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study contributes to the limited literature on Asian REITs by examining the 
impacts of free cash flow and agency costs on the performance of REITs in Asia. This 
Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step Two-Step 
Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with Diff GMM Diff GMM with 
Items Robust SE Robust SE Robust SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
REIT RETURN REIT RETURN REIT RETURN REIT RETURN REIT RETURN REIT RETURN
Lagged 1 -0.113998 -0.113998 -0.1777892 -0.1777892 -0.1113121 -0.1113121
(-2.34)** (-1.48) (-2.78)*** (-1.81)* (-3.13)*** (-1.56)
FCF1 -4.497449 -4.497449
(-0.95) (-0.75)
FCF2 8.619044 8.619044
(0.84) (0.66)
FCF3 -1.79E-07 -1.79E-07
(-0.59) (-0.27)
Asset Turnover -3.224557 -3.224557 2.187819 2.187819 3.340523 3.340523
Ratio (-0.57) (-0.33) (0.16) (0.12) (0.53) (0.34)
Operating -0.5409539 -0.5409539 -2.181398 -2.181398 -1.338955 -1.338955
Expense Ratio (-0.71) (-0.42) (-0.87) (-0.66) (-1.26) (-0.62)
SGA Ratio -0.0649702 -0.0649702 -0.1024365 -0.1024365 0.3265676 0.3265676
(-0.16) (-0.05) (-0.25) (-0.19) (0.39) (0.14)
NOIVOL1 1.726244 1.726244 24.50123 24.50123 5.682061 5.682061
(0.50) (0.26) (1.59) (0.86) (1.53) (0.84)
NIVOL1 -0.4664968 -0.4664968 -3.762521 -3.762521 -1.136265 -1.136265
(-0.66) (-0.36) (-1.80)* (-0.98) (-1.48) (-0.89)
Size -1.529655 -1.529655 -1.076387 -1.076387 -0.7303293 -0.7303293
(-2.10)** (-1.13) (-0.74) (-0.56) (-0.96) (-0.54)
Age 0.1102015 0.1102015 0.1509851 0.1509851 0.0860017 0.0860017
(2.82)*** (1.87)* (2.11)** (0.76) (2.14)** (1.24)
Growth 1.165736 1.165736 1.369911 1.369911 0.948883 0.948883
(3.60)*** (1.94)* (3.80)*** (1.65)* (3.04)*** (1.53)
Leverage -0.0143927 -0.0143927 0.9158451 0.9158451 1.687781 1.687781
(-0.01) (-0.01) (0.29) (0.10) (1.26) (0.78)
Divpay ratio 0.0251351 0.0251351 0.1329476 0.1329476 0.0506823 0.0506823
(0.46) (0.30) (1.33) (0.87) (1.05) (0.55)
Profitability -0.6437169 -0.6437169 -5.813443 -5.813443 -0.0635056 -0.0635056
(-1.33) (-0.77) (-0.92) (-0.71) (-0.15) (-0.10)
Market 0.8077942 0.8077942 0.858161 0.858161 0.8303118 0.8303118
Return (8.37)*** (6.05)*** (8.50)*** (5.37)*** (10.53)*** (6.52)***
Constant 8.444636 8.444636 4.822821 4.822821 3.138437 3.138437
(1.82)* (0.97) (0.45) (0.34) (0.64) (0.36)
Sargan Test 8.755609 5.281444 9.852532
[1.0000] [1.0000] [0.9998]
AR(1) -1.8633 -1.5508 -0.43691 -0.1929 -1.2205 -1.0231
[0.0624]* [0.1210] [0.6622] [0.8470] [0.2223] [0.3063]
AR(2) -0.71491 -0.5754 1.3459 0.77365 -0.3184 -0.28504
[0.4747] [0.5650] [0.1783] [0.4391] [0.7502] [0.7756]
No of 86 86 64 64 92 92
Observations
No of 47 47 43 43 45 45
Instruments
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study employs GMM method which is more robust compared to previous studies that 
used pooled OLS and panel data method.  
 
 By using panel data of the four biggest market capitalization of Asian REITs, 
namely, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia, firstly, this paper examines the 
impacts of free cash flow on agency costs. Secondly, this paper also assesses the 
impacts of these free cash flow and agency costs on the performance of REITs in Asia.  
 
The findings indicate that there are significant impacts of free cash flow on 
agency costs such as on the asset turnover, operating expense ratio, selling, general 
and administrative expenses ratio (SGAR), net operating income volatility 1 
(NOIVOL1) and net income volatility 1 (NIVOL1) respectively. 
 
Interestingly, the results suggest that the free cash flow supports free cash flow 
theory in one hypothesis but it does not support free cash flow theory in another 
hypothesis. This shows that the free cash flow is minimal due to the dual directions of 
the free cash flow theory in the findings. 
 
This also implies that the inherent risk associated with free cash flow is minimal 
in the REITs. This can be attributed to the “REIT effect” (Bauer, Eichholtz and Kok, 
2010) whereby REITs payout 90% of its earning as distribution or dividend payout for 
tax exemption. The deviation from optimal free cash flow is minimum and less costly. 
Moreover, the REIT managers know how to gauge managerial optimism in REITs.  
 
 In addition, this study also indicates that free cash flow and agency costs exist 
and persist over time in Asian REITs even though REITs are in a highly regulated 
industry. The findings indicate that the agency costs such as asset turnover and 
operating expense ratio persist over time and affect the REIT performance, return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) negatively and respectively. Besides that, 
asset turnover and net income volatility (NIVOL1) have significant negative impacts 
on the REIT value. These agency costs discount the value of REITs in Asia. Moreover, 
the net income volatility (NIVOL1) decreases the REIT return. Hence, the agency costs 
persist and affect the performance of REITs in Asia. 
 
 The lagged individual agency cost such as lagged asset turnover, lagged SGA 
ratio, lagged NOIVOL1 and lagged NIVOL1 are significantly positive to its agency cost 
respectively. These lagged individual agency cost induces higher agency costs in 
REITs in Asia. There are dynamic and complex in the models.  
 
 These findings also imply that REIT managers face substantial costs when they 
wish to adjust to the equilibrium level of agency costs, whereby the optimum level is 
always dynamic and not constant over time and moves with the changes in the 
determinants of agency costs. These agency costs persist over time. The adjustment 
speed is dependent upon on the lagged individual agency cost. The adjustment speed 
is given by 1 minus the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.  
 
 This also implies that the REITs in Asia should consider internally managed 
REIT structure since the agency costs persist over time and there are always dynamic 
and not constant over time and moves with the changes in the determinants of agency 
costs. 
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 Moreover, the internally managed REIT structure provides empirical evidences 
that they outperform the externally managed REIT structure in the US REITs studies 
(Cannon and Vogt, 1995; Capozza and Seguin, 2000; Clayton and MacKinnon, 2000; 
Ambrose and Linneman, 2001). 
 
 Besides that, the findings depict that the Asian REITs possess their own unique 
characteristics. They differ in term of size, age and other aspects that may cause Asian 
REITs to vary differently. These include financial position, operation management, 
economy of scale and expertise in REIT management skills that may have different 
and significant impacts on the performance of REITs in Asia. The findings also show 
that the leverage, dividend payout ratio, growth and profitability can help to mitigate or 
induce agency costs in the REITs in Asia. 
 
 The findings also imply that the regulators in Asian REITs should enforce 
absolute stringent corporate governance rules and regulations in order to govern the 
existing inherent handicapped satellite structure of the externally managed REITs in 
Asia.  
 
 In addition, the Asian REITs regulators should plan to have REITs that are 
internally managed; and to provide expertise, education and training for the existing 
externally managed REITs to transform into internally managed REIT structure. This 
can be done through detailed planning and implementation of the project within a 
proper time frame.  
 
 For other countries in Asia such as India, China, Philippines, Indonesia and 
Pakistan, they should consider absolute stringent corporate governance rules and 
regulations on REITs and internally managed REIT structure in order to provide 
sufficient investor protection and to establish a more robust REIT market in these 
important emerging markets. 
 
 For REIT regulators in Asia, this empirical study helps to provide useful 
information for policy planning and formulation in REIT corporate governance; and to 
transform the inherent handicapped satellite structure of the externally managed 
REITs into internally managed REIT structure. 
 
 For REIT managers and practitioners, this empirical study also helps them to 
be more aware of the dynamism of free cash flow and agency costs in REITs; and 
alert them that these free cash flow and agency costs persist over time which can have 
significant impacts on the REIT performance, return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE), REIT value and REIT return respectively in Asia. Thus, they could 
consider internalizing their REIT management structure.  
 
 As a whole, this empirical study contributes significant benefits to all levels of 
the REIT industry in Asia. Lastly, for future research, researchers can embark on 
research studies on issues that might determine the speed of adjustment towards the 
equilibrium level of agency costs in Asian REITs. 
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